Suchergebnisse
Filter
27 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
Chapter 12 Inequality, poverty and welfare
In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, S. 597-633
Book Reviews : TIMUR KURAN, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995
In: The Indian economic and social history review: IESHR, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 486-487
ISSN: 0973-0893
Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 113-122
Individual strategy and manipulation of issues
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 169-176
Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 39-49
Rational expectations and farsighted stability
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional "moves" in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. However, it does not require that each coalition make a maximal move, i.e., one that is not Pareto dominated (for the members of the coalition in question) by another. Nor does it restrict coalitions to hold common expectations regarding the continuation path from every state. Consequently, when there are multiple continuation paths the farsighted stable set can yield unreasonable predictions. We resolve this difficulty by requiring all coalitions to have common rational expectations about the transition from one outcome to another. This leads to two related concepts: the rational expectations farsighted stable set (REFS) and the strong rational expectations farsighted stable set (SREFS). We apply these concepts to simple games and to pillage games to illustrate the consequences of imposing rational expectations for farsighted stability.
BASE
Incomplete information, credibility and the core
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 148-165
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 109-127
Networks and groups: models of strategic formation
In: Studies in economic design
Child labour and household wealth: theory and empirical evidence of an inverted-U
In: Journal of development economics, Band 91, Heft 1, S. 8-14
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
Child labor and household wealth: Theory and empirical evidence of an inverted-U
In: Journal of development economics, Band 91, Heft 1, S. 8-14
ISSN: 0304-3878
Child Labor and Household Wealth: Theory and Empirical Evidence of an Inverted-U
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2736
SSRN